This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual revelation of information and the eventual full revelation is supported by the dynamic rewards and punishments. The construction of a fully revealing equilibrium relies on two key features. The …rst feature is that the expert is incentivized, via appropriate actions, to join separable groups in which she initially pools with far-away types, then later reveals her type. The second feature is the use of trigger strategies. The decision maker is incentivized by the reward of further information revelation if he chooses the separation-inducing actions, and the threat of a stop in information release if he does not. Our equilibrium is non-monotonic. With monotonic partition equilibria, full revelation is impossible.
Introduction
The seminal paper on strategic information transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982) is a model of choice for a number of applications, ranging from economics and political science, to philosophy and biology. 1 In that paper, a biased and privately informed expert and a decision-maker interact only once. The con ‡ict of interest results in coarse information revelation, and in some cases, in no information at all. We study strategic information transmission in a dynamic extension of the Crawford and Sobel setup. Each period the expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Only the expert knows the state of the world which remains constant over time. We maintain all other features of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) environment, in particular, that the interests of the expert and the decision maker di¤er.
There are many environments in which information transmission is dynamic. Many sequential decisions have to take place, and the decision maker seeks the expert's advice prior to each one of them. The earlier literature on dynamic communication has focused on the role of reputation, see, for example, Sobel (1985) , Morris (2000) , and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) , (2006b). Our paper focuses on the dynamics of strategic communication.
Our most surprising, and di¢ cult to establish …nding, is to show that full information revelation is possible. The construction of the fully revealing equilibrium relies on two key features. The …rst is the use of the separable groups: types which are far apart initially pool together and then separate.
As such, there is gradual revelation of information. The second feature is that the dynamic nature of the game enables the use of "trigger strategies," in which the expert promises better advice in the future if the decision maker chooses an action bene…cial for the expert now. That is, the use of trigger strategies is used to incentivize the decision maker, and to facilitate a gradual release of information that leads eventually to full revelation.
In a nutshell, in a multi-period interaction, communication can be facilitated by generating appropriate posteriors and by the use of trigger strategies, whereby the expert employs a signaling rule, that makes future information revelation credible if his advice is followed early on. We now provide more details on the roles of separable groups and trigger strategies in our construction of a fully revealing equilibrium.
We show that, over time, it is possible to divide all states into separable groups. A separable group is a set of types which are su¢ ciently far apart that each would reveal the truth, rather than mimic any other type in his group. Therefore, we create histories after which it is common knowledge that the decision maker puts probability one on a particular separable group, at which point the types in this group separate. The division of all types into separable groups is quite delicate, because, given that there is a continuum of types, we need to form a continuum of such groups. The expert anticipates that if at some point he joins a separable group, then he will forgo his informational advantage. For the expert to join the separable group containing his true type, we have to make sure that he does not want to mimic a close-by type, who is supposed to join a di¤erent separable group. This is done via appropriate separation-inducing actions. The decisionmaker is willing to choose such actions, despite their being non-myopically optimal, because the expert threatens to babble otherwise.
We emphasize another necessary condition for full information revelation. The fully revealing equilibrium cannot be a monotonic partition equilibrium. In a monotonic partition equilibrium, the expert employs a uniform signaling rule where each type sends one message with probability one, and the set of types that choose the same message is connected. We prove that if attention is restricted to monotonic partition equilibria, learning stops. Moreover, we argue that non-monotonic equilibria can be strictly Pareto superior to all dynamic monotonic equilibria. Overall, we conclude that monotonic partition equilibria constitute a special class of equilibria in our dynamic setup, whereas this is a canonical class of equilibria in the static setup of Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
Non-monotonic (or non-convex) equilibria also play also a prominent role in Baliga and Sj½ ostr½ om Welfare properties of equilibria are another di¤erence between the dynamic and the static strategic communication games. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, under some assumptions, both the expert and the decision maker ex-ante (before the state is realized) prefer equilibria with higher number of partitions. We provide an example that shows that it is not necessarily the case for dynamic equilibria. More partitions of the possible states of the world (i.e. larger number of equilibrium vectors of actions) do not guarantee higher expected payo¤ for the expert and the decision maker. The reason is as follows. In the dynamic setup the intertemporal nature of the indi¤erence conditions that pin down the cuto¤s that characterize partition equilibria allow for a much richer set of possibilities which overturn the static Pareto comparison results. A similar phenomenon occurs when the communication is noisy, as shown in an example of the working paper version of Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) . In their example, a two-step partition Pareto dominates a three-step partition. Finally, we present an example in which dynamic monotonic partition equilibria can be strictly Pareto superior to playing the most informative one-shot equilibrium in the …rst period, and babbling thereafter.
Our work shows that the nature of dynamic strategic communication is quite distinct from its static counterpart. In the static case, because of the con ‡ict of interest between the decisionmaker and the expert, nearby expert types have an incentive to pool together, precluding full information revelation. The single-crossing property also implies that in equilibrium, the action is a monotonic step function of the state. These two forces make complex signaling (even though possible) irrelevant, given that it is observationally equivalent to partitional signaling, and imply that only local incentive compatibility matters. In the dynamic setup the key di¤erence is that today's communication sets up the stage for tomorrow's communication. Complex signaling helps in the dynamic setup, because it can lead to posteriors where possible states are su¢ ciently far apart that they have no incentive to mimic each other. Sustaining in equilibrium such posteriors requires complex signaling where one needs necessarily to worry about global incentive compatibility.
Related Literature
Crawford and Sobel (1982) is the seminal contribution on strategic information transmission.
That paper has inspired an enormous amount of theoretical work and myriads of applications. Here we study a dynamic extension. Other papers that look at dynamic relations between one expert and one receiver di¤er from ours because, as already mentioned, their focus is on the sender's reputation.
Other papers have a dynamic aspect because they allow for multi-round communication protocols, but with a single round of action(s). Aumann and Hart (2003) characterize geometrically the set of equilibrium payo¤s when a long conversation is possible. In that paper, two players-one informed and one uniformed, play a …nite simultaneous move game. The state of the word is …nite, and players engage in direct (no mediator) communications (possibly in…nitely long exchange of messages), before both choosing simultaneously costly actions. In contrast, in our model only the informed party sends cheap messages-the uniformed party chooses actions and the state is in…nite. Krishna and Morgan (2004) add a long communication protocol to Crawford and Sobel (1982) 's game, whereas Goltsman Hoerner, Pavlov and Squintani (2009) characterize such optimal protocols. Koessler (2008a, 2008b) allow for a long protocol in a setup where messages can be certi…able. In all those papers once the communication phase is over, the decision maker chooses one action. In our paper, there are multiple rounds of communication and actions (each expert's message is followed by an action of the decision maker).
In our setup, the dynamic nature of communication enables full information revelation. In contrast, full information revelation is not possible in the dynamic setup of Andrelini, Gerardi, and Laguno¤ (2008) who consider dynamic strategic communication is a dynastic game and show that if preferences are not fully aligned "full learning" equilibria do not exist. Renault, Solan, and Vieille (2011) examine dynamic sender-receiver games, in a setup where the information is not fully persistent and the state is …nite. They restrict attention to Markov equilibria and characterize the set of equilibrium payo¤s. In contrast, we assume fully persistent information and a state drawn from a continuum, and focus mainly on non-markovian equilibria. Ivanov (2011) allows for a dynamic communication protocol in a setup where the expert is also initially uninformed and the decision maker controls the quality of information available to the expert.
Our model bears some similarities to the static strategic communication with multiple receivers.
In those models the expert cares about a sequence of actions, but in contrast to our model, those actions are chosen by di¤erent individuals. An important di¤erence is that in our model the receiver cares about the entire vector of actions chosen, compared to those models where each receiver cares only about his own action. Still, some of the properties of the equilibria that we obtain also appear in the models with multiple receivers. For example, our non-monotonic example presented in Section 4 resembles Example 2 of Goltzman and Pavlov (2008). It is also similar to Example 2 in Krishna and Morgan (2004) . 2 Full information revelation is possible in other variations of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) setup: When the decision maker consults two experts as in Battaglini (2002) , Eso and Fong (2008) and Ambrus and Lu (2010) ; 3 when information is completely or partially certi…able, as in Mathis (2008); and when there are lying costs and the state is unbounded as in Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) . In the case of multiple experts, playing one against the other is the main force that supports truthful revelation. In the case of an unbounded state, lying costs become large and support the truth. In the case of certi…able information, one can exploit the fact that messages are state-contingent to induce truth telling. All these forces are very di¤erent from the forces behind our fully revealing construction.
The Environment
We extend the classical model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a dynamic setting. There are two players: an Expert -E (sender) and a Decision Maker -DM (receiver) who interact for …nitely many periods t = 1; :::; T . The expert knows the state of the world 2 [0; 1] which is constant over time and is distributed according to the c.d.f. F . At the beginning of each period t, the expert sends a (possibly random) message m t which depends on the realization of the state to the decision maker. The decision maker then updates his beliefs about the state and chooses an action y t 2 R that a¤ects both players'payo¤s. There is a con ‡ict of interest because, for all states , the expert's ideal choice of action di¤ers from the decision maker's. This is captured by a scalar b; the bias parameter of the expert. The discount factor of the expert and the decision maker is i 2 [0; 1] for i 2 fE; DM g: When the state is and the decision maker chooses actions y T = (y 1 ; ::; y T ), the expert's payo¤ is given by U E (y T ; ; b) = and the decision maker's payo¤ is given by
We assume that period payo¤s u E (y t ; ) and u DM (y t ; ; b) satisfy the conditions imposed by Crawford and Sobel (1982) , namely that (i) u i is twice di¤erentiable, for all ; (ii) @u i (y; ) @y = 0 for some y for i 2 fE; DM g; (iii) that @ 2 u i (:;:) @y 2 < 0; and (iv) a single crossing condition,
@ @y > 0. Conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee a unique maximum in y.
Let y DM ( ) and y E ( ) denote, respectively, the decision maker's and the expert's most preferred action when the true state is known by both players . The single crossing condition ensures that y DM ( ) and y E ( ) are increasing in . We assume that, regardless of the state , a con ‡ict of interest exists: y DM ( ) 6 = y E ( ), for all .
The decision maker observes his payo¤s only at the end of the game. He does not observe his payo¤ at each period t. Otherwise, the problem would be trivial because the decision maker can learn the expert's information by simply inverting his payo¤.
A strategy pro…le = ( i ) i=E;DM , speci…es a strategy for each player. Let h t denote a history that contains all the reports submitted by the expert m t 1 = (m 1 ; :::; m t 1 ), and all actions chosen by the decision maker y t 1 = (y 1 ; :::; y t 1 ) up to, but not to including stage t. The set of all feasible histories at t is denoted by H t . A behavioral strategy of the expert, E ; consists of a sequence of signaling rules that map [0; 1] H t to a probability distribution over reports M. Let q(m j ; h t ) denote the probability that the expert reports message m at history h t when his type is . A strategy for the decision maker, DM , is a sequence of maps from H t to actions. We use y t (m jh t ) 2 R to denote the action that the decision maker chooses at h t given a report m: A belief system, , maps H t to the set of probability distributions over [0; 1]: Let F ( jh t ) denote the decision maker's beliefs about the experts's type after a history h t , t = 1; :::; T: A strategy pro…le and a belief system is an assessment. We seek strategy pro…les and belief systems that form
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, (PBE).
In the paper we use the terminology as follows.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is called babbling if for all m with q(m j ; h t ) > 0; all 2 [0; 1], all h t and t; we have that y t (m jh t ) =ŷ:
In other words, we call an equilibrium babbling, if the same action is induced with probability one for all states 2 [0; 1] and all t 2 T:
De…nition 2 We call a signaling rule q uniform, if q(m j ; h t ) is uniform, with support on
De…nition 3 A partition equilibrium is one in which, at each period t and history h t ; the expert employs only uniform signaling rules.
In other words, at a partition equilibrium, the expert follows a pure strategy in which, for any message m, the set of types sending message m is connected.
De…nition 4 An equilibrium is fully revealing if there exists aT
T such that after all histories along the equilibrium path leading toT ; the expert sends for all 2 [0; 1] a di¤ erent message with probability one, inducing y t ( ) = from t =T on.
Uniform Signaling
We …rst brie ‡y summarize the static cheap talk game of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which uniform signaling rules are the canonical form of communication in static games. We then study properties of uniform signaling in our dynamic setup.
The Canonical Static Communication
We start by reviewing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. Fix an equilibrium of the oneshot game and let y( ) denote an action induced when the state is . The con ‡ict of interest between the expert and the decision maker (y DM ( ) 6 = y E ( ), for all ) implies that there are at most …nitely many actions induced. The fact that u E is strictly concave in y, together with single-crossing and the …niteness of actions, implies that there are at most …nitely many states where the expert is indi¤erent between two induced actions. Then, y( ) can be, without loss of generality, taken to be single-valued. Because y takes at most …nitely many values, it is an increasing step function.
The state space is divided into a …nite number of subintervals, and y takes a di¤erent value in each subinterval. Importantly, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, without loss of generality, equilibrium induced actions, y can be taken to arise from uniform signaling rules. This result follows from the observation that all messages inducing the same action y can be replaced by a single message. Therefore, more complex signaling rules play no role in the static setup.
Uniform Signaling: A Special Kind of Dynamic Communication
We now focus on simple partitional communication protocols (uniform signalling) and study their properties in our dynamic setup. We show two results. The …rst result is that with monotonic partition equilibria the decision maker never learns the truth. The second result establishes that when the bias is so large that only one action is induced at an equilibrium of the static game, the same is true also in dynamic monotonic partition equilibria. Finally, an example shows that dynamic partitions can di¤er and can be more informative compared to static ones.
In constructing partition equilibria, the main di¤erence from the static case is that the expert's indi¤erence conditions that characterize the cuto¤s of the partitions are intertemporal. This makes the explicit solution of the resulting di¤erence equation di¢ cult even in simple environments, such as in the uniform quadratic loss case. To overcome this di¢ culty, we notice that at some point in the game the expert's indi¤erence conditions reduce to the static ones and then apply the results of Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
Using this approach, we …rst show that among the class of monotonic partition equilibria, there exists no equilibrium in which the decision maker eventually learns the state of the world for all
That is, there exist no fully revealing equilibria.
Proposition 1 For all T , there exist no fully revealing monotonic partition equilibria.
This result follows almost immediately from Crawford and Sobel (1982) . A short sketch of the argument is as follows. First, note that by de…nition, in a fully revealing monotonic partition equilibrium, there must exist a period in the game at which a continuum of possible actions is induced. Now, suppose by contradiction that there exists such an equilibrium. Then, there exists a periodT T in which the last subdivision occurs, with y t ( ) = , for all t T . AtT the expert's indi¤erence condition reduces to the static one. Since y t ( ) = (respectively y t ( + ") = + ")
fromT onwards then:
and similarly for state + ". These conditions are equivalent to the static conditions in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , who proved that they imply that at most …nitely many actions can be induced at an equilibrium of a static game, a contradiction to full revelation.
We now proceed to show that if all static equilibria are equivalent to babbling then all dynamic monotonic partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
Proposition 2 If all static equilibria are equivalent to the babbling equilibrium, then all dynamic monotonic partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is also easy to see that the payo¤s of both the expert and the decision maker of any static equilibrium can be achieved as a per period payo¤s in the dynamic communication game. We can construct an "equivalent"(in terms of payo¤s) dynamic equilibrium as follows: In the …rst period, all types follow the same strategies as in the static equilibrium. For all t > 1 experts of all types "babble", and the decision maker repeats the same action she took in period 1. It is trivial to verify that these strategies constitute an equilibrium.
In Appendix B, we show an example when in our dynamic setup (T = 2) both players can be strictly better-o¤ compared to the best static equilibrium. In that example, E = DM = 1, the state is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and preferences satisfy
At the most informative static equilibrium the state space is divided in two subintervals: [0; However, in dynamic settings it is also possible to have equilibria with more partitions that are inferior to ones with less (we present an example of such an equilibrium in Appendix C). This happens because a larger ultimate number of partitions may require extensive pooling earlier on, inducing overall lower welfare. This …nding is in contrast to Crawford and Sobel (1982) , who show that under their Assumption M equilibria can be easily Pareto ranked: both the expert and the decision maker ex-ante (before the state is realized) prefer the equilibrium with the highest number of partitions and actions induced. 4 Our …ndings suggest that Pareto comparisons in dynamic cases are less straightforward, even if we restrict attention to monotonic partitional equilibria.
We proceed to study the role of complex signalling in our dynamic game.
An Example with Complex Signaling and Dynamic Information Revelation
In this section we present an example where the expert employs a complex signalling rule that induces an action of the decision maker that is not monotonic in the state. We show that, for a range of biases, this equilibrium is superior to all monotonic ones.
In the example below, the bias is so severe that if communication and the decision were static (one round), as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , all equilibria are equivalent to babbling. We show, that even in these extreme bias situations, some information is released even with two rounds. This equilibrium has the feature that the decision maker learns the state quite precisely when the news is either horri…c, or terri…c, but remains agnostic for intermediate levels. With this signaling rule, the optimal actions of the decision maker for periods 1 and 2 are, respectively, given by:
After any out of equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability 1 to the state belonging to [ ; ], inducing an action equal to y out = + 2 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs no type of the expert has an incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.
In order for this to be an equilibrium, type must be indi¤erent between message sequence A and B:
and type must be indi¤erent between message sequence B and C :
At t = 2 it must also be the case that type prefers m 2(1) to m 2(3) , and the reverse for type :
A solution of the system of equations (2) and ( (2) and (3) su¢ ce for global incentive compatibility. 5 An important feature of the constructed non-monotonic equilibrium is that it exists even though the only monotonic partition equilibrium in this (dynamic) game is a trivial babbling equilibrium. This example highlights how complex signalling can lead to better communication in a multistage games. By pooling together the best and the worst states at t = 1; the expert is willing at t = 2 to reveal whether the state is very good or very bad. It also has the following implication.
Proposition 3 There exists non-monotonic equilibria that are Pareto superior to all monotonic partition equilibria.
Given that for preferences given by (1) and b > 0:25; the only equilibrium in the static game is babbling, this Proposition follows immediately from the preceding discussion.
We now construct a non-monotonic equilibrium with even higher welfare properties. The key is to allow the expert to condition his future communication of the previously chosen action of the decision maker. We call such strategies trigger strategies. Our main result in the section that follows is that the dynamic set-up correlates the incentives of the expert and DM in such a way that full information revelation is possible. We present this next.
Main Result: Full information revelation in dynamic cheap talk games
One of the most stark results of the static strategic communication game is that there is no equilibrium with full information revelation. Although the state can take a continuum of values, the expert sends at most …nitely many signals to the decision maker. That is, substantial amount of information is not transmitted. In this section, for our dynamic strategic communication model we construct an equilibrium that is fully revealing. The construction of the equilibrium relies on two tools: the use of separable groups, and the use of trigger strategies. These tools have no leverage in single-round communications, but are powerful in dynamic communications.
Simple Case: Learning the Truth when the Expert is Myopic
We …rst show how to construct a fully-revealing equilibrium when the expert is myopic. The example shows how we use separable groups of far away agents who mimic each other but not the nearby types. In the case of the myopic expert, there is no need to use trigger strategies which we introduce in the example of the patient expert.
There are two essential ingredients of this example. First, the set of types that choose the same message at t = 1 are su¢ ciently far apart so they can be separated at t = 2. That is, each message is chosen by a separable group of types (a group of types which are apart). Second, the average of types in each group is constant. The …rst period action is then ‡at. Irrespective of the state, all experts induce the same action. This implies that the expert does not care which group he joins (since a myopic expert cares only about the 1st-period action, which is constant across groups).
Example 2 Fully revealing equilibrium with impatient experts ( E = 0).
Consider the uniform quadratic loss case as in (1) when the bias is b < 1 16 and T = 2. The expert is impatient ( E = 0). The construction works for any discount factor for the decision maker.
In period 1, the expert for states f "g; the expert sends a message m" for" 2 (0; 1 4 ). That is, we have two types of separable groups: indexed by " and". Given this signalling rule, the best response of the decision maker at t = 1 is to choose:
y(m") =
In period 2, the expert tells the truth, inducing an action equal to the state. After any out-ofequilibrium message at t = 1, the decision maker assigns equal probability to all states, leading to action y out = 0:5. After any out-of-equilibrium message at t = 2, the decision maker believes that the state is equal to the smallest state that is possible, leading to an action equal to y out = 0.
If the expert is impatient ( E = 0), then for any b < 1 16 we argue that this is an equilibrium. First, notice that all messages (even out-of-equilibrium ones) induce the same action at t = 1.
Hence, at least from the t = 1 perspective, all types of the experts are indi¤erent among them. Now consider, for example, the history after m " was chosen at stage 1. At this history the posterior of the decision maker at t = 2 puts weight To see that at t = 2 the expert has no incentive to deviate, we consider, for instance, type = 
which is satis…ed if b < 1 16 . A similar argument holds for other types. Additionally, any outof equilibrium message at t = 2; leads to y out = 0 which is always worse than y 2 ( ) = since
The situation after a message m" is analogous.
This construction does not apply when the expert is patient, because it does not provide the expert with incentives to join the "right"separable group as we discuss below. We turn to the case of a patient expert next.
Full Information Revelation with a Patient Expert
The main contribution of the paper is to construct a fully revealing equilibrium when the expert is patient. ; there is an in…nite set of priors F , and a horizon T ; for which a fully revealing equilibrium exists whenever T T :
We provide a sketch of the proof and leave the details to the appendix.
There are two key constructs in the proof.
The …rst is the use of the separable groups as in the case of the myopic expert above. Rather than having intervals of types pool together we construct pairs of far-away types who pool together in the initial periods. The advantage is that we no longer need to worry about these paired types mimicking nearby types after they join the separable group. Their only options are to tell the truth, or to mimic each other. Of course, an important part of the proof is to ensure that these paired types indeed would prefer to join the "right" separable group. In our construction for a myopic expert, the induced action in the …rst period, u ( ), was ‡at as the expert's incentives were static.
In fact, that proof relied only on constructing separable groups without the use of trigger strategies.
For the case of the patient expert, the construction of the separable groups is signi…cantly more involved as it has to take into account the dynamic incentives. In particular, the actions that the decision maker takes in the initial stages cannot be ‡at. If the expert cares about the future, and, say the …rst-period action is ‡at, the expert will join the initial separable group that leads to the best future action. Hence, for a patient expert, we need to choose initial action functions which provide incentives to join the truthful separable group. If type knows that some type 0 will get a more favorable action in the revelation phase, then type 's group must induce an initial action which is more favorable to type than that induced by ( 0 )'s group.
The second key part of the construction is the use of the trigger strategies. The need for the trigger strategies is closely related to the construction of the separable groups. In the revelation stage the decision maker gets rewarded as the experts reveal themselves. However, this revelation is obviously costly for the expert. To induce the expert to separate at the revelation stage the earlier actions taken by the decision maker have to provide appropriate rewards to the expert. These expert-incentivizing action functions turn out to be incompatible with the myopically optimal actions from the DM's perspective. Therefore, to make the DM cooperate with the equilibrium, we need to use trigger strategies. The expert threatens that if the DM rejects his early advice, the expert will stop revealing information. If the DM follows expert's advice, DM will be rewarded with eventual full revelation of the state.
Before we proceed with the proof, it is useful to simplify notation and work with a scaled type space by dividing all actions and types by b. When we say that "type 2 [0;
2 ", we mean that (in the unscaled type space) type b
We …rst partition the scaled type space [0; These recommendations continue up to time t = 2 a (in Lemma D7.1, we will specify 2 a 2 0 ).
At t = 2 a 2 0 , Group II and III switch to the recommendation u 2 . Group I continues recommending action v 2 . There is no additional revelation of information here. The switch to action u 2 is needed (we will expand on this below) to ensure that the correct separable groups were chosen at time t = 1.
At time T , types in Group I get separated into I and h I . That is, from time t = T to time T these types, respectively, recommend I and h I . Note that the function h ( ) is chosen to have a property j h ( ) j 2 to ensure separation in this revelation stage. 8 In the appendix, we show that depends on the horizon T and approaches T as the bias b gets close to zero.
At time T 2, types in Group II and III get separated. That is, from time t = T 2 to time T the types, respectively, recommend II and g II , or III and g III . Note that from time 2 0
Groups II and Group III were already separated (but the types within each respective group still were pooled). At time T 2 the …nal separation of the paired types occurs. Note that the function g ( ) is chosen to have a property j g ( ) j 2 to ensure separation in this revelation stage.
The strategies of the expert switch to babbling if at any time the decision maker does not follow any prescriptions by the expert (the details are in the appendix).
To summarize -there are three key phases. The initial phase is at time t = 1 is when the types are paired and choose their separable groups. The second stage is information transmission in which the experts give recommendation (u 1 ; u 2 ) and (v 1 ; v 2 ). In these phases, the DM refrains from taking the myopically optimal option and sticks to the prescribed recommendations in order to be rewarded at the revelation phase. One can think of these two stages loosely as providing the correct incentives for the expert to join the separable groups. The third stage is revelation stage in which the paired types separate.
Finally, we brie ‡y comment on the construction of the functions (u 1 ; u 2 ) and (v 1 ; v 2 ) which are given parametrically in the appendix. They are designed such that the following incentive constraints are satis…ed. 9 The …rst set of constraints can be thought of as local incentive compat- The natural question arises: why do we need more than one reward phases? The reason is as follows. In order to ultimately achieve full-information revelation the expert types must voluntarily join separable groups, revealing some information. Suppose that we only had one reward phase. If the decision maker uses the information released up to that point to choose his action, then the expert would not …nd it optimal to join the separable group. In other words, rewards su¢ cient to incentivize the expert require the decision maker to choose an action that di¤ers from the myopic best response. In order, then for the deviation to the myopic best response not to be attractive, it must be the case that the DM remains su¢ ciently agnostic about the state of the world. This is achieved by having two separable pairs of types pool together during phase 1 and then breaking into to two pairs in phase 2. At the beginning of the second phase, the reward to the expert is smaller because the division to separable pairs has already occurred. Put it di¤erently, the reason why one need to have two actions u 1 and u 2 is to ensure that there is indi¤erence at the endpoints, and that the average action is increasing. Having only one action (say, u 1 ) will only ensure that condition the indi¤erence at the endpoints is satis…ed.
Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that dynamic strategic communication di¤ers from its static counterpart. Our most striking result is that fully revealing equilibria exist. We also presented a series of examples that show how the canonical results of the static strategic communication games may not hold in the dynamic settings.
The main novel ingredient of our model is that there are many (…nite) rounds of communication and after each round an action is chosen. The dynamic considerations of the expert allow us to group together types that are far apart, forming "separable" groups which is the key ingredient behind the construction of fully revealing equilibria and of non-monotonic equilibria. The dynamic setup of our model also allows us to use trigger strategies.
Our analysis highlights the nature of incentive compatibility in dynamic incentive settings. One important characteristic is that dynamic incentive constraints can bind for a disconnected set of types. Moreover, the fact that posteriors are endogenous, implies that earlier rounds in the game can be used to induce posteriors that eventually allow the decision maker to learn the truth. At those nodes in the game the information rents of the expert disappear.
The forces that we identify can be present in other dynamic environments where there is asymmetric information and limited commitment as to what will happen later in the game. Think, for example, a dynamic contracting environment where there is limited commitment about the future, to type we can either move it further away from type 's bliss point, or increase the variance by pulling the …rst two recommendations further apart.
or, more generally, a dynamic mechanism design problem, or some other dynamic game where one imposes the requirement of sequential rationality. In those models as well, past behavior setups the stage for future behavior because posteriors are endogenous. And, in contrast to the vast majority of the recent literature on dynamic mechanisms design, 11 one needs to worry about global incentive compatibility despite the fact that stage payo¤s satisfy the single-crossing property.
Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 2
When we restrict attention to monotonic partition equilibria there will be some point in the game where the last subdivision of an interval into smaller partitions occurs. This can either happen at the last period, or at some period before last. Assume without loss, that one interval is partitioned into two inducing actions y 1 (m 1 ) and y 2 (m 2 ) : If it happens in the last period T of the game, then the indi¤erence condition of the expert type -call that type^ -that is indi¤erent between y 1 and y 2 is the static one. But then, if a subinterval of the original state space can divided into two, it cannot be the case that all static equilibria are equivalent babbling. This follows by Corollary 1 of Crawford and Sobel (1982) ). Now, suppose that the last subdivision happens at a period before the last. Say at periodT : Given that no further subdivision occurs afterT ; when the expert sends a message that induces y 1 (resp. y 2 ) atT the same action is induced for the remaining number of periods T T : Then the indi¤erence condition for type^ expert is
which is equivalent to static. But then, as before, this subdivision atT is not possible given that all static equilibria are equivalent babbling.
Observe that all the arguments in this proof go through even if we allow for trigger strategies. This is because at the point where the last subdivision occurs, it is impossible to incentivize the decision maker to do something worse than his myopic best response. To see this, note at that point, either the game ends -whenT = T , so there is no time to reward the decision maker for choosing a suboptimal action at T orT < T: Suppose thatT < T; and assume without loss, that one interval is partitioned into two inducing actionsỹ 1 (m 1 ) andỹ 2 (m 2 ) and suppose thatỹ 1 generates a payo¤ for the DM di¤erent from the myopic best response y 1 ; then in order for the DM to followỹ 1 it must hold
which contradicts the fact that y 1 is the myopic best response given m 1 : Hence, the DM cannot choose actions that give him a payo¤ di¤erent from the payo¤ at the myopic best response. This together with the strict concavity of u DM imply that y 1 =ỹ 1 :
B Monotonic partition equilibria with more partitions
Suppose that E = DM = 1; types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and preferences satisfy (1) . Suppose that bias b = 1 12 : Using standard arguments, one can establish that game has only two equilibria, 12 a babbling equilibrium and an equilibrium with two partitions, where the space is divided in two sub-intervals: [0; : Now we show that when 1 2 The largest number of subintervals that the type space can be divided into is the largest integer that satis…es
whose solution is
and where hxi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x: 
The second period actions induced are y 2(1) = 
:
After any out-of-equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability one to the state belonging in [0; 1 ] inducing y out = 1 2 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see that no type has an incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.
At an equilibrium 1 must satisfy the following indi¤erence condition:
which with the help of (8) In constructing this strategy pro…le we have imposed that type 2 is indi¤erent between inducing action y 2(2) and y 2(3) at t = 2 and that type 1 is indi¤erent between inducing action sequence y 1(1) and y 2(1) and y 1(2) and y 2(2) : Now we want to verify that these conditions are su¢ cient for global incentive compatibility. At t = 2 the game is isomorphic to the static one, where the fact that 2 is indi¤erent between y 2(2) and y 2(3) implies that all types above 2 prefer y 2(3) and all types below 2 prefer y 2(2) : To verify that types below 1 prefer message sequence A inducing y 1(1) and y 2(1) ; and types above 1 prefer message sequence B inducing y 1(2) and y 2(2) ; we plot the di¤erence U (A; ) U (B; ) and show that it is positive for all < 1 and negative for > 1 :
At the dynamic equilibrium we constructed here the expert's welfare is 0:065 and the decision maker's welfare is given by 0:0517, which are both higher than the welfare at the equilibrium where the most informative static equilibrium is played in the …rst period, and babbling in the second, which are respectively 0:069 and 0:055:
C Pareto comparisons of dynamic cheap talk equilibria
The following examples demonstrate that equilibria with more partitions can be Pareto inferior to the equilibria with fewer partitions Take from which we can calculate the ex-ante expected utility levels for the expert 0:032 and for the decision maker 0:0263. Then, at the equilibrium of the dynamic game where the most informative static equilibrium is played at t = 1 and babbling thereafter, the total expected utility is 0:065 for the expert, and 0:053 for the decision maker.
We now construct a dynamic equilibrium where the type space is subdivided into more subintervals, but both players'ex-ante expected payo¤s are lower. We look for an equilibrium with the following signaling rule:
So types are partitioned into four intervals in stage 2, but in stage 1, the types in [ 1 ; 2 ] and [ 2 ; 3 ] pool together to send the same message m 1 (2) : Since the signaling rule does not depend on the decision maker's action at stage 1, the decision maker will choose the following myopically optimal actions:
After any out-of-equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability one to the state belonging in [0; 1 ] inducing y out = 1 2 : With these out-of-equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see that no type has an incentive to deviate.
In equilibrium, type 1 is indi¤erent between action sequences fy 1(1) ; y 2(1) g and fy 1(2) ; y 2(2) g; type 2 is indi¤erent between 2nd-period actions y 2(2) and y 2(3) ; and type 3 is indi¤erent between action sequences fy 1(2) ; y 2(3) g and fy 1(3) ; y 2(4) g: Therefore, equilibrium cuto¤s are the solution to the following system of equations: 13 This example illustrates that although the interval is divided into more subintervals here, both players strictly worse o¤ compared to the one where the most informative static equilibrium is played in the …rst period and babbling thereafter. The feature that less partitions lead to higher ex-ante welfare for both players also appears in example 1 of Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007).
D Proof of Theorem 1
We will prove by construction that a fully revealing equilibrium exists. We …rst choose the endpoints 1 ; 2 ; 3 described in the proof outline: for any bias b < In our proposed equilibrium construction, each Group I pair fz(a); h(a)g recommends v 1 (a; 0 ) for 2 0 periods, then v 2 (a; 0 ) for T 2 0 periods, then reveals the truth at time T ; each Group II pair fx(a); g(a)g recommends u 1 (a; a ) for 2 a periods, then u 2 (a; a ) for 2(1 a ) periods, then separates and reveals the truth at time T 2; and moreover, the recommendation u 1 (a; a ) coincides with the recommendation v 1 (a 0 ; 0 ) of some Group I pair fz(a 0 ); h(a 0 )g: Group III is identical to Group II, except that their recommendations do not coincide with those of any Group I pair.
We also specify the following o¤-path strategy for the expert: if the DM ever deviates, by rejecting a recommendation that the expert made, then (i) if the expert himself has not previously deviated: send no further recommendations (equivalently, repeat the current recommendation in all subsequent periods). And (ii) if the expert has observably deviated in the past, behave as if the deviation did not occur. (For example, if he sends the initial recommendation u 1 (0; 0 ) prescribed for types fx(0); g(0)g; but then follows this with anything other than recommendation u 2 (0; 0 ) at time 2 0 ; subsequently behave as if the deviation never occurred and he indeed sent u 2 (0; 0 ) at time 2 0 ):
D.1 Optimality for the Expert
We prove that the expert wishes to follow the prescribed recommendation strategy via three propositions. Proposition D1 speci…es strategies and beliefs for the DM such that the expert has no incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium recommendation sequence, so we can restrict to making sure that he does not wish to mimic any other type. Proposition D2 shows that in the prescribed revelation phase, the expert indeed …nds it optimal to reveal the truth, provided that there have been no previous deviations. It remains only to show that the expert has no incentive to deviate prior to the prescribed revelation phase -by mimicking the initial recommendations of some other type -which we show in Proposition D3.
D.1.1 Expert Optimality: O¤-Path Behavior
We specify the following strategy and beliefs for the DM: DM Strategy and Beliefs: If there are no detectable deviations by the expert (i.e., he sends the equilibrium recommendation sequence for some type 2 [0;
, then follow all recommendations, using Bayes'rule to assign beliefs at each information set. Following deviations: (i) If the expert observably deviates at time 0 (sending an o¤-path initial recommendation), subsequently adopt the strategy/beliefs that would follow if the expert had instead sent the recommendation u 1 (0; 0 ) prescribed for types fx(0); g(0)g; (ii) If the expert observably deviates on his 2nd recommendation (i.e., if an initial recommendation u 1 (a; a ) (or v 1 (a; 0 )) is followed by something other than u 2 (a; a ) (or v 2 (a; 0 )); ignore it as an error, and subsequently adopt the strategy/beliefs that would follow had the deviation not occurred; (iii) If the expert deviates observably in the revelation phase, ignore it as an error, assigning probability 1 to the lowest type in the current information set, and accordingly choosing this as the myopically optimal action; (iv) And …nally, if the DM himself deviates, rejecting some recommendation by the expert, then he subsequently maintains the current (at time of deviation) beliefs, anticipating that the expert will subsequently repeat the current (at time of deviation) recommendation, and ignoring any other recommendations as errors. Proposition D1: Under the above strategy and beliefs prescribed for the DM, the expert has no incentive to choose an o¤-path recommendation sequence. Proof of Proposition D1: Follows trivially from the speci…ed strategy and beliefs for the DM: (i) a deviation at time zero is equivalent to mimicking type x(0) (who recommends u 1 (0; 0 ) at time t = 0); (ii) a deviation on the 2nd recommendation has no e¤ect, since the DM ignores it; (iii) a deviation in the revelation phase, if there have been no previous recommendations, is equivalent to mimicking the strategy of the lowest type in the DM's current (pre-revelation) information set; and (iv) if the DM has previously deviated, then (by point (iv) of the above strategy-belief speci…cation) he will chose whichever action was myopically optimal at the time of deviation, regardless of the expert's message; therefore, babbling is optimal for the expert, since his message has no e¤ect on the DM's action.
D.1.2 Expert Optimality: Truth Revelation Phase
Proposition D2: In the prescribed revelation phase, (i) if there have been no previous deviations by the DM, then the expert …nds it optimal to reveal the truth; (ii) if the DM has ever deviated, then the expert …nds it optimal to babble (eg. by remaining silent). Proof of Proposition D2: Part (ii) follows immediately from Proposition D1 (iv). For part (i): our speci…cation of the expert strategy is such that at time 2 0 ; the DM's information set contains at most two types: either a pair fx(a); g(a)g (in which case he plans to choose g(a) if the expert recommends g(a); x(a) otherwise), or a pair fz(a); h(a)g (in which case he plans to choose h(a) if the expert recommends it, z(a) otherwise). So, it su¢ ces to show that each type would rather tell the truth than mimic his partner, which requires (in our rescaled state space) simply that all paired types be at least 2 units apart. We have, 
D.1.3 Expert Optimality: Initial Recommendations
Propositions D1,D2 imply that once the expert has sent the initial recommendation (u 1 or v 1 ) prescribed for some type ; it is optimal to follow also the continuation recommendations prescribed for that type. So, the only time when it could possibly be pro…table to deviate is at time t = 0 : we need to make sure that each type prefers to send the proposed equilibrium sequence of recommendations, rather than the sequence prescribed for any other type 0 : 14 We now choose parametrizations of functions x; g; z; h; along with action function u 1 ; u 2 ; v 1 ; v 2 , which guarantee that the expert indeed …nds it optimal to send the prescribed initial recommendation:
Proposition D3: Let the action functions and type parametrizations be as follows:
for constants C u ; K; and for now taking T; 0 ; a as given (T is the horizon, and a ; 0 relate to the duration of recommendations u 1 ; v 1 as described in the strategies above). Also set (length of the revelation phase for types in Group I) according to
Then, for all types ; 0 2 [0;
1 b ]; expert type prefers his equilibrium recommendation sequence to that sent by type 0 ; and in particular has no incentive to deviate at time t = 0 from the prescribed strategy. Proof of Proposition D3: 1 4 This is what the text refers to as "providing incentives to join the right separable group". We need to make sure, for example, that type = 0 prefers to induce the action sequence (u1(0); u2(0); 0); rather than e.g. the sequence that type 0 6 = 0 is supposed to send; by Propositions D1,D2, the choice to follow a di¤erent recommendation sequence can only be made at time t = 0: 
has the same sign as (x(a) ) : 2); we see that
has the same sign as z(a) ; and is thus positive (disutility increasing in z(a)
) if z(a) > ; and negative (disutility increasing in z(a)) if z(a) < : Combined, these establish that D u (z(a)j ) is strictly increasing in jz(a) j ; as desired. By (18) The argument that types 2 [ 3 ;
1 b ] don't wish to mimic types from other intervals is identical to the proof in the previous paragraph (for types 2 [ 2 ; 3 ]).
This completes the proof of Lemma D3.2.
D.1.4 Expert Optimality: Preliminary Calculations
Lemma D3.3: Given the type parametrizations and action functions given in Proposition D3, disutility expressions
Proof of Lemma D3.3:
The disutility D u (g(a)j ) to expert type from following the strategy prescribed for type g(a) 2
Expanding gives 15
If we now expand this expression, the coe¢ cients on a 2 ; a reduce to zero (this is due to our choice g(a) = 3 + a); leaving
which rearranges to expression (21) :
The disutility to type from following the strategy prescribed for type x(a) 2 [0; 1 ]; D u (x(a)j ); is given by (24) ; just replacing g(a) with x(a) : this gives the desired expression (20) :
The disutility to type from following the strategy prescribed for type h(a) 2
Again, the coe¢ cients on the square root terms in v 1 ; v 2 were chosen to make both disutility and average action independent of 0 : substituting (13) ; (14) into the above expression and expanding, we get
Substituting in h(a) = 4 + a; using 3 = 4 + a ; and expanding, we …nd (this is due to our choice h 0 (a) = 1) that the coe¢ cients on both a 2 ; a reduce to zero, so that our expression simpli…es further to (23) : Finally, using the fact that the strategies for types h(a); z(a) di¤er only in the revelation phase, so
we obtain (22) : This completes the proof. Lemma D3.4: (utility at the endpoints) Under the expressions given in Proposition D3, we have that (i) at 1 = x( 2) = z(0) : type (weakly) prefers type x( 2)'s recommendation sequence to z(0)'s sequence i¤ 2 [0; 1 ]; (ii) at 2 = z(a ) = g( 2); type prefers z(a )'s sequence to g( 2)'s sequence i¤ 2 [0; 2 ]; and (iii) at 3 = g(0) = h(a ); all types are indi¤erent between the sequences sent by types g(0); h(a ): 16 Proof of Lemma D3.4:
At 1 = x( 2) = z(0); we have (using the expressions in Lemma D3.3 and simplifying) that
Using ( 4 1 ) = (T 2)
(by (15)); this simpli…es to
This is negative, meaning that type prefers z(0)'s strategy to x( 2)'s strategy, i¤ > 1 ; thus establishing part (i). At 2 = g( 2) = z(a ); we have (by (22) and (21)
This is negative, meaning that type prefers g( 2)'s strategy to z(a )'s strategy, i¤ > 2 ; proving part (ii). At 3 ; we have (by (21) and (23)),
so that all types are indi¤erent between the strategies prescribed for type g(0) = 3 ; h(a ) = 3 ; as desired to complete the proof.
D.2 Optimality for the DM
Let the expert strategy be as speci…ed in the previous subsection, using the action functions and parametrizations from Proposition D3, with = (T 2) as in (15) : Recall that we had the following free parameters: constants K; C u ; the horizon T , a number 0 2 [0; 1]; and numbers a 2 [0; 1] 8a 2 [ 2; 0]: We wish to show that the speci…ed strategies constitute a fully revealing PBE: since we established expert optimality in the previous section, and since the beliefs and o¤-path strategies speci…ed for the DM (see Proposition D1) trivially satisfy all PBE requirements, all that remains is to prove that the DM's on-path strategy is optimal.
So, to prove Theorem 1, we just need to prove that we can choose K; C u ; 0 ; the a 's, and a horizon T 17 such that whenever b < 1 61 ; there exist (many) priors s.t. if the DM holds the corresponding Bayesian beliefs at each information set, then he …nds it optimal to follow all expert recommendations (assuming no observable deviations).
Recall the following features of the expert strategy: at time t = 2 0 ; Group I and II pairs separate, with Group I then revealing the truth at time T ; pairs from Groups II and III reveal the truth at time T 2: It is immediately clear that during the "revelation phase", when the expert's recommendation is equal (with probability 1) to the true state, the DM indeed …nds it optimal to follow the recommendation. In between time 2 0 (when the DM learns whether the state lies in Group I, II, or III) and the group's corresponding revelation time ( or T 2); no new information is revealed, but rejecting any (on-path) recommendation by the expert will cause the expert to subsequently babble rather than reveal the truth. So, the best possible deviation is : part (i) says that type 1 is indi¤erent between the two sequences prescribed for his type, and that everyone below 1 prefers the strategy of type x( 2); everyone above 1 prefers the strategy of type z(0): 1 7 We prove here that there exists some T that works; we can trivially extend the construction to hold for all T T ; as in the theorem, simply by beginning with a babbling phase.
to choose the myopically optimal action in all subsequent periods. If such a deviation is optimal at some time t; then it is optimal also prior to time t (when information is the same, but the "reward phase"(following revelation of the truth) is further away). So, to prove that the DM does not wish to deviate, it is su¢ cient to prove that deviating is not optimal at the earliest time at which new information is revealed. We summarize this in the following observation: Observation D4: If the DM cannot gain by deviating at time t 2 f0; 2 0 g; then the prescribed strategy is optimal. So, we just need to prove that we can choose our free parameters such that (for a range of priors and b < 1 61 ) the DM does not wish to deviate at time t = 0 or t = 2 0 : We do so via three main propositions. All three rely on calculations from Lemma D7.1 below, which shows that for the constants K; C u in (28) ; (29) and T 4, we can choose 0 and the a 's (with a 0 8a) such that the range of v 1 ( ; 0 ) is contained in the range of u 1 ( ) : So every recommendation sent by a Group I pair is also sent by a Group II pair, for at least as long. Taking these values as given, Proposition D5 will prove that the DM has no incentive to deviate at time t = 2 0 if he gets a message v 2 (a; 0 ) from a Group I pair, for a range of posteriors. Proposition D6 proves that with these constants, there is a range of probability measures such that whenever b < 1 61 ; it is strictly optimal for the DM to follow the prescribed recommendation at time t = 0 if the DM believes that it came from any pair fx(a); g(a)g; which implies also that he does not wish to deviate at time t = 2 0 if he realizes he is facing a Group II pair (again, we prove this for a range of posteriors). It remains only to prove that there are in…nitely many priors generating the Bayesian posteriors in Propositions D5, D6, which we show in Proposition D7. This will complete the proof that we have a fully revealing PBE.
D.2.1 Optimality for the DM: Deviations at time t = 2 0
Proposition D5: Suppose that the DM receives recommendation v 2 (a) at time t = 2 0 ; and assigns probabilities q a ; 1 q a to the two types z(a); h(a) in his information set. Also set
There exists a range of values for qa 1 qa such that (i) whenever a 2 < 8; we can choose a horizon T such that the DM's strategy is strictly optimal in the limit as 0 ! 1; and (ii) whenever a 2 > 8; we can choose a horizon T such that the DM's strategy is strictly optimal in the limit as 0 ! 0: 18 
Proof of Proposition D5:
If the DM follows recommendation v 2 (a) (expecting to choose this action until time T ; then learn the truth); his expected disutility is
The best possible deviation is to instead choose myopically optimal action q a z(a) + (1 q a )h(a) in all remaining T 2 0 periods, for disutility
Lemma D7.1 will show that we need only an upper bound on 0 for biases satisfying the condition a 2 > 8 in (ii), and a lower bound on 0 for biases satisfying a 2 < 8; with speci…ed by (15), a 2 > 8 , a < 3:18:
So to prove the Proposition, we need to show that there are q a 's s.t. the following inequality holds:
This is easiest to satisfy (RHS is minimized) at
where (30) becomes
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for the DM's IC constraint (30) to hold is
which implies both that (32) holds (so the DM does not want to deviate), and that q a (from (31)) is indeed a probability, since we have
Simplifying, and using h(a) z(a) = 2 a a and 3 4 = a (from (10) and (9)), this implies that
e y where k 2K T
; t T T
; and y a a (with de…ned in (33)): So by (34), we wish to show that for all y 2 [0; a ];
By construction, the value of K speci…ed in (29) sets the square root portion of v 1 ; v 2 equal to zero at a = 0 , y = a (see Lemma D7.1), so we have
We …rst prove (ii). Suppose a 2 > 8; in which case Lemma D7.1 requires ; the desired upper bound in (35). In the …rst line, note that if we set s.t.
then the limiting expression ( 2 y + (1 + )e y ); which is minimized at y = ln 2 +1 < 1; has a minimum value of 2 ln
which is positive, thus trivially satisfying the desired lower bound in (35). So, any < 3:4959 satis…es (strictly) the DM's ex-post constraint in the limit as 0 ! 0; so by continuity the constraint holds also for all 0 su¢ ciently close to zero. To complete the proof of (ii), we just need to show that we can choose a horizon T; satisfying the requirement
2 (from Proposition D6 and Lemma D7.1), which corresponds to 0 near zero and < 3:4959: We have, recalling that (15) (speci…cally = (T 2)) implies T = ; so t = T T = (1 ) ; that
So we need ; together with the constraint 2 (from Proposition D6, Lemma D7.1), we obtain that for a 2 > 8; the DM's strategy is optimal for any horizon T satisfying T < 
De…ne f (y) k ty + q k 2 + ( 2 t) (2ky ty 2 ); we want to prove that
To this end, note that
This implies that f (y) reaches a maximum (over y 2 [0; a ]) at y = 0, and lies above the straight line connecting the points (0; f (0)) and ( a ; f ( a )) : since we have f ( a ) = k + ta (the square root term is zero here by construction), and f (0) = k + p k 2 = 0; this line e f is given by
this becomes e f (y) = ; then all DM IC constraints are slack in the limit as 0 ! 1 (and so, by continuity, hold for all 0 su¢ ciently high, which satisfy the bounds in Lemma D7.1). This completes the proof. ; there exists a range of values p a such that if the DM assigns probabilities p a ; 1 p a to types x(a); g(a); then his gain to deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g is strictly negative at any time t 0: Proof of Proposition D6: As explained in Observation D4, it su¢ ces to prove that the gain to deviating is negative at time t = 0: Substituting x(a) = 3 + a 3 e a ; g(a) = 3 + a; and C u = 0 into (55) ; we obtain that the DM's gain to deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g; if he assigns probability p to type x(a); is
The derivative of this expression w.r.t. a is
So, it su¢ ces to choose a value p s.t.
and then set p(a) = p for all a 2 [ 2; 0] : the …rst inequality guarantees that the expression in (39) is negative (so the DM's ex ante gain to deviating is decreasing in a; thus the gain is largest -so the IC constraint is most di¢ cult to satisfy -at a = 2); the second inequality says that this maximal gain, obtained by evaluating (38) at a = 2; is negative. Suppose …rst that a 2 [ 2; 1:7726]; and consider setting K = 4; p = 4 : in this case, (39) ; and (38) at a = 2; become (respectively) 
This implies also that 3 e 2
4(K+T )
T 4 ; so that (39) holds p = 1 2 . So, we just need to show that (42) holds, which implies that the DM's gain to deviating at fx(a); g(a)g is largest at a = 2; and satis…ed at a = 2 (hence satis…ed also for all a 2 ( 2; 0]). For this, we will use the notation from (the proof of) Proposition D5:
Suppose …rst that a 2 > 8 : for this range, we proved Proposition D5 using < 2 and 0 ! 0 (which implies also that
Rearranging to solve for T; we need T ; with x (a 2 + 2e a ); since
it follows that for large 0 and p near 1 2 ; ex ante incentive compatibility for the DM holds, at every information set of the form fx(a); g(a)g; for any T 6:
Suppose next that a 2 < 8 (and a 2) : for this range, we proved Lemma DM2 using 0 ! 1 and = 2; in which case
Substituting into (42) ; we need a 2+2e
Here is a graph of the above expression for a 2 [ 3:2; 2] (using = , and noting that a 2 < 8 ) a 3:2) : [ 1 ; 2 ] ). And similarly, now use this and the second expression above to assign a prior to each type h(a) 2 [ 3 ; 4 ]: Finally, choose M so that the total measure of the type space integrates to 1 (This is possible since (11) ; (13) imply that u 1 ; v 1 and their derivatives w.r.t. a are …nite and non-zero except perhaps at a single point a; from which it follows that jb a 0 (a)j is …nite (again, except perhaps at a single point a)): Therefore, all our measures (x(a)); (g(a)); (z(a)) are …nite numbers divided by M ; so, integrating over the state space results in a …nite number divided by M: Choose M so that this number equals 1.
D.2.4 Optimality for the DM: Preliminary Calculations
Lemma D7.1: De…ne Proof of Lemma D7.1: We …rst prove (i). Note that
So, a 2 > 8 implies that we need only verify that 0 > 0; while if a 2 < 8; we need 0 < 1: In the …rst case,
which rearranges to give 0 > 0: In the second case, rearranging the inequality 0 < 1 gives
, T 2 = 1 ; this rearranges to the inequality a < 1 q , which is implied by a 1:7726 ) :4172 and 2: This establishes (i). Now for (ii) and (iii): with C u as speci…ed by (28) ; the equations in (11) ; (12) become
We …rst prove (ii). To show that v 1 ( ) is real-valued, note that the term in square roots is decreasing in a (derivative w.r.t. a has the same sign as 2K T (a a ); which is negative by K < 0 and a a ); so we just need to show that minimum value, which is at a = 0; is non-negative: that is, we need
The value of K speci…ed in (29) is precisely the negative root of this equation, so the above inequality holds by construction. For u 1 ( ) to be real-valued, we need
The 2nd term is either minimized at a = 0 (in which case the expression clearly holds), or at a = 2; in which case it holds (for K < 0) i¤
! For this to be satis…ed by the K-value in our construction, we need
(2nd line obtained from 1st by (i) replacing with (T 2) in the LHS numerator; (ii) multiplying both sides by ; and …nally (iii) on the resulting RHS, multiplying both numerator and denominator by
; so the RHS is at most
Therefore, to prove the desired inequality, it is su¢ cient to show that the following holds:
The RHS is precisely the value 0 de…ned in the Lemma, so 0 0 is su¢ cient to guarantee that u t ( ) is real-valued. This completes the proof of (ii).
Finally, to prove (iii): by (43) and (44) we have
; and u 1 ( 2; 1) = K + T 2: So, if we set (0) = 0 and ( 2) = 1; then
On the other hand,
Clearly the second expression is positive, so we have that
That is, v 1 ( ) is strictly increasing on [a ; 0]; with ( 2; 1) ; we need to show that
, using = (T 2); and dividing by a (which ‡ips the inequality), this becomes
For this, it is su¢ cient to prove the following (which replaces the 2nd numerator term on the LHS with its maximum value (at 0 = 1)):
Multiplying both sides by (1 )(T 2 0 ), this rearranges as
Replacing the LHS with the upper bound at 0 = 1; and dividing through by (T ); we obtain the following su¢ cient condition: 
E Appendix E: Derivations
In this section, we explain how the functions and parameters in our fully revealing construction were chosen.
E.1 For the Expert:
Suppose we wanted an equilibrium in which each type 2 [0; 1 ] pools with a type g( ) 2 [ 2 ; 3 ]; to recommend an action u 1 ( ) in period 1, u 2 ( ) in period 2, and then reveal the truth at time T 2. The disutility to type from following the strategies prescribed for types 0 ; g( 0 ) is then
In order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be that D u ( 0 j ) reaches a minimum over [0; 1 ] at 0 = (so that type earns a lower disutility by telling the truth than by mimicking any other type 0 in the interval [0; 1 ]), and that D u (g( 0 )jg( )) reaches a minimum at g( 0 ) = g( ): We can do this by simply choosing functions that satisfy the corresponding …rst-and second-order conditions: beginning with the F.O.C.'s, we need
Subtracting the 2nd expression from the 1st, we get
If we de…ne a( ) ln
Now: the disutility from telling the truth is
Substituting (46) into this expression, we get may be any non-negative constant. Setting this equal to type x(a) 0 s truthtelling disutility (evaluate (49) at = x(a)), using u 2 (a) = k (T 2)a u 1 (a) (from (48)); and solving for u 1 (a); u 2 (a); we obtain with u 2 (a) = k u (T 2)a u 1 (a): Evaluating this at x(a) = 3 + a 3 e a and ku 2 = K + 3 gives precisely our expression u 1 (a; a ) in (11) evaluated at a = 1 2 ; the expressions in (11) ; (12) were "rescaled" (via the coe¢ cients on the square roots) such that both disutility and average actions are independent of a :
Now, for our S.O.C.'s: di¤erentiating (45) w.r.t. 0 gives 1 2
This implies that a su¢ cient condition for truth-telling to indeed yield a minimum on disutility is that the average action induced by each type ; u 1 ( ) + u 2 ( ) + (T 2) ; be increasing: in this case,
is positive for any 0 > (as type contemplates mimicking types 0 further above him, disutility increases, making him worse o¤), and negative for 0 < (as he moves further below the truth, disutility increases, also making him worse o¤), but zero at 0 = : thus, telling the truth is better than mimicking any other type in the interval.
To sum up, this has shown that given arbitrary interval endpoints 1 ; 3 0 and g(a) x(a) = 3 e a ; if we want an equilibrium in which types x(a); g(a) recommend u 1 (a) for one period, then u 2 (a) for one period, then separate and reveal the truth, then truth-telling satis…es the F.O.C. for disutility minimization i¤ u 1 ; u 2 are as speci…ed by (51) and u 2 (a) = k u (T 2)a u 1 (a): If we additionally impose the requirement that average action be increasing in type, then we satisfy also the S.O.C.'s; this requires that each of x 0 (a); g 0 (a) is either negative or 1: Analogously, for arbitrary functions z : a v 1 (a); k v and C v constants. And the S.O.C.'s, guaranteeing that truthtelling indeed yields a disutility minimum over the interval, reduce to the requirement that each of z 0 (a); h 0 (a) is either negative or 1: The proof that no expert type wishes to deviate after the initial recommendation follows almost trivially from the prescribed strategies.
It remains to show that no expert type wishes to mimic the initial recommendation of any type from any other interval. This reduces to the additional requirements that at each endpoint i 2 f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g; the average action is non-decreasing at i (if discontinuous), and type i is indifferent between the two sequences that he can induce. Our construction chooses the speci…c parameterizations g(a) = 3 + a and h(a) = 4 + a, with x(a) = g(a)
3 e a ; z(a) = h(a) ( 4 1 )e a : Then we have x 0 (a) = 1 3 e a 1 3 e 2 ; z 0 (a) = 1 2e a a 1; and g 0 (a) = h 0 (a) = 1; which clearly satisfy the S.O.C.'s (provided that 3 e 2 2; we in fact will restrict to 3 e 2 8): With this, the expressions in (51) ; (52) become (with K
We chose a 1 = 2 and g 0 (a) = 1 because this is in fact the only way that the indi¤erence constraint at 2 can hold simultaneously with both the indi¤erence constraint at 3 ; and the increasingaverage-action requirement at 2 : We chose h 0 (a) = 1 just for simplicity. With it, the remaining increasing-average-action constraints do not bind, and the indi¤erence conditions reduce to the following requirements on the relationships between k v ; C v ; (parameters from the v t -functions) and k u ; C u ; T (parameters from the u t -functions): 
2)
With this, the expressions in (53) ; (54) simplify exactly to the expressions for u 1 (a; a ) in (11) and v 1 (a; 0 ) in (13) ; at a = 1 2 ; 0 = T 4 ; in Proposition D3, we then rescaled (11) ; (13) for other values of a ; 0 in such a way that incentives are not a¤ected.
E.2 For the DM:
Suppose the DM receives the recommendation u 1 (a; a ) in period 1. If he assigns probabilities (p a ; 1 p a ) to types x(a); g(a); then his disutility from following all recommendations is p a 2 a (u 1 (a; a ) x(a)) 2 + 2(1 a ) (u 2 (a; a ) x(a)) 2 +(1 p a ) 2 a (u 1 (a; a ) g(a)) 2 + 2(1 a ) (u 2 (a; a ) g(a))
2
Substituting in the expression for u 1 (a; a ),u 2 (a; a ) from (11) ; (12) ; and expanding, this becomes
This says that the likelihood of type x relative to p(x) is equal to the unconditional likelihood ratio (determined by the prior ); times a term which depends on the shape of the p-function, in particular due to its in ‡uence on the size of the interval of p-types compared to the size of their partner interval, [x; x] : To understand this formula, consider an example in which is uniform and p ( ) is linear, say p(x) = + x: In this case, the interval [p(x); p(x)] is times as large as the interval [x; x] ; so intuitively, it is as if the message sent by type x is sent by "copies" of type p(x) : therefore, the DM's beliefs assign times as much weight to type p(x) as to type x; which is precisely what our formula says. Beliefs are assigned analogously after period 1. For our particular construction, our belief formula in (58) becomes:
after a message (or message sequence) sent by types fx(a); g(a)g; a 2 [ 2; 0] :
Pr(x(a)) Pr(g(a)) = (x(a)) (g(a))
x 0 (a) g 0 (a) = (x(a)) (g(a)) ( 3 e By "bunching", we mean that we will create the 4-type information sets described in the third bullet point above. More precisely, we choose the parameters 0 ; a to make sure that the range of v 1 is contained in the range of u 1 ; so that any initial recommendation sent by a pair fx(a); g(a)g is also sent by a pair fz(a); h(a)g (see Lemma D7.1).
